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My sources include the records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (Pritchard and Zaide 1981) , monographs prepared by former Japanese officers regarding the operations of the Japanese Southern Army (Detwiler and Burdick 1980) , French archival material,3 and English-language press accounts from Indochina and Japan.4
Japan's "New" Indochina
The Japanese-after employing the Vichy-aligned French administration in Indochina for almost fifty-four months as an administrative tool to extract as large a share of war contributions as Indochina could afford toward Japan's Greater East Asia
War-terminated the mutually profitable arrangement on March 9, 1945 (Hammer 1954:26; Vu 1984:chaps. 2, 5) . That evening, Ambassador Matsumoto Shunichi handed Governor-General Jean Decoux an ultimatum demanding Japan's direct control of Indochina and the disarmament of French troops and armed police within two hours.
Immediately after the time limit had expired, brushing aside Decoux's call for further negotiations, the Japanese military commanders ordered their troops to attack all French offices and garrisons in Indochina, and within forty-eight hours, the Japanese were in complete control. Decoux, his close associates, and almost all generalsincluding General Eugene Mordant (code-named "Narcisse"), delegate general of the French Provisional Government under General Charles de Gaulle-were arrested. Only 
Vu
NGU CHIEU East Asian Nations (L'Action, March 19 and April 15, 1945) . Their subordinates, save for the most unpopular and convinced Francophiles, were kept on in office, and some were promoted to higher positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy to replace French superiors.
In Viet-Nam, Supreme Adviser Yokoyama Masayuki reportedly visited King Bao
Dai in Hue on the morning of March 11 and successfully convinced him to collaborate with the Japanese. Bao Dai convened a cabinet meeting that afternoon, which gave unanimous support to his proclamation of independence from France. This proclamation deserves special attention. First, whether intentionally or not, it referred only to "Annam"-a term that might be interpreted as either Annam (the Central region)
or the former Kingdom of Dai-Nam (all three regions) . Second, the proclamation abrogated only the 1884 treaty regarding French "protection" of Annam and Tonkin;
it completely ignored the treaties of 1862 and 1874 concerning the status of Cochinchina and the cities of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Da Nang (Tourane). Finally, Bao Dai's declaration of independence from France was accompanied by a declaration of dependence on Japan, pledging to "extend all-out cooperation to the Japanese Empire with sincere faith in the true intentions of Japan" (Nippon Times, March 14, 1945) .
Bao Dai's role in Japan's original plan thus was similar to his role during French rule-he was a royal symbol without substantial power. Nevertheless, facing a rising nationalist trend inside Viet-Nam, the Japanese decided to recast Bao Dai's role. As a result, on March 17, Bao Dai handed his office director a written note, instructing the latter that he was to assume direct control of state affairs, based on the principle of dan vi qui (the most precious thing is the people; a teaching of Mencius) (Hoe 1982:60; Ngay Nay, May 5, 1945) .5 Two days later, the former ministers of the Frenchpatronized Court of Hue resigned. Bao Dai was then free to search for new men of talent and virtue (tai duc).
Bao Dai's declaration of independence thus directly concerned only Annam and
Tonkin. Although it inspired hopes for national independence and territorial unification in Cochinchina, for the time being it had no formal effect on the political situation in that region. Governor Minoda more than once reminded the over-excited Viet ac- tivists that Japan's definition of "independence" was a severely limited one. On March 29, 1945, for instance, he insisted that no one should misunderstand the fact that Cochinchina was under Japanese military authority or that the independence of VietNam would depend on the outcome of the war (L'Action, March 31, 1945) .
The Situation in Viet-Nam: March-April 1945 Japan's purge of the French and grant of "conditional independence" to Bao occurred during a period of extreme difficulty in which public support for his lea was seriously eroded.
First, it was obvious at that time that Japan was losing the war. The prospect of the defeat of Japan stimulated a noncommittal attitude among the educated classes that supplied most of Japan's collaborators. Meanwhile, Charles de Gaulle's provisional government in Paris worked hard to prepare for the reconquest of Indochina. Parallel to their attempt to secure international recognition of the French "sovereign right" s Bao Dai's reign-name means "Protector of the Greatness," and he did not adopt the new reignname Dan Vi Qui. The word hieu in Ngay Nay (May 5, 1945 ) means "motto" or "banner" (khau hieu). It is an error to translate it as "reign-name" (de hieu).
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over Indochina, the French authorities sent spies and commandos to Viet-Nam for intelligence and sabotage operations (Sainteny 1953; SHAT [Vincennes}: IOH 79 and 85) . French propagandists stressed the official French declaration of March 24, 1945, in which France promised to give the five Indochinese states greater autonomy and to carry out various reforms to raise the living standard of the people (JOFI, November 15, 1945:2-3) . More ominously, the French launched a propaganda campaign aimed at causing suspicion and division among Vietnamese political groups. Among the other things, the French repolished the image of the former "rebellious" King Duy Tan (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) , who was dethroned and exiled to Reunion after he was involved in an abortive anti-French uprising in May 1916. This propaganda was intensified during the summer of 1945, when Duy Tan was brought from Reunion to Paris as a step in de Gaulle's so-called "secret project" regarding Indochina (Gaulle 1959:230-31; Boissieu 1981:308-11, 333-36; L'Institut Charles de Gaulle 1982:174-80, 199-201; Vu 1984:chap. 12 ).
Meanwhile Viet-Nam was coming closer to anarchy, accentuated by the independence fever, the Great Famine of [1944] [1945] , and the rise of the Communist-led Viet Minh front, under the auspices of the American OSS.
One of the most significant developments immediately after the Japanese Meigo Operation of March 9-10, 1945, was the outburst of the independence fever in VietNam. The word doc lap (independence) had a magical effect, which altered the attitude of everyone. In Hanoi a journalist noted that "we are entering into a new historical phase. The Japanese troops' gunshots here on the night of March 9, 1945, destroyed the life of enslavement which had lasted for almost a century under cruel French domination. From now on, we are allowed to conduct our own true life" (TTTB, May 5, 1945) .
Even those who had previously considered French rule closely tied to their "bowl of rice" changed their attitude. Japan's employment of Bao Dai successfully cultivated support among the Viet elite and rich and powerful families. Hoang Trong Phu, the most powerful francophile figure in Tonkin during the French period, arrived in Hue to advise Bao Dai on the future independent government of "Annam." Vi Van Dinh, the leading notable among the Tay (Tho) population in Lang-son, came to Hanoi to advise Nishimura Kumao (L'Action, April 7, 1945) . Ho Dac Diem, considered by the Gaullist French as one of seventeen candidates who could be smuggled out of the colony to represent the Indochinese peoples at the French consultative assembly, retained his post of provincial chief of Ha-dong, on the southern outskirts of Hanoi (AOM [Paris], AP, carton 3448). Even Pham Quynh, well-known for his collaboration with the French, was reportedly willing to collaborate with the Japanese (Hoe 1982:59-60) .
The roads to Hue were suddenly crowded with important figures in Western suits or mandarin robes, invited by the Japanese or by themselves to make Viet-Nam an independent nation within Japan's Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.
This political explosion coincided with the Great Famine of At Dau (Year of the Chicken; 1945), a tragic event in Tonkin and northern Annam. The famine had started in late 1944; it was the final explosion of economic tension that had built up during the period of French rule; the famine was characterized by the increasing impoverishment of the inhabitants, and it intensified during the Japanese Occupation. Under normal conditions, the peasants in Tonkin and Annam barely produced enough rice for their own subsistence. In the case of natural disasters, they needed rice supplies from the south. However, beginning with the main-season harvest of 1943 (NovemberDecember), the Decoux administration had ordered all peasants in Tonkin and Annam to sell their "surplus rice" to the government. This meant that each villager had to Vu NGU CHIEU sell to the government a fixed quota regardless of the size of his harvest. In addition, the official price paid by the government was far below the market rate. Together with the abuse of power and profiteering by the rice collectors, this practice eliminated peasants' reserve stocks and bankrupted many middle landowners. Meanwhile, the air raids and naval blockade of the United States cut off nearly all rice transport from Cochinchina to the northern regions. The small amount of rice that was occasionally shipped was reserved for consumption in the cities or for conversion to industrial alcohol for military use.6 Consequently, after late 1943 the peasants in Tonkin and Annam had to depend on each successive year's uncertain rice harvest or had to fall back on whatever subordinate crop they could manage to grow (Lieu, Bich, and Dam 1957: vol. 2:87-88 took to the road in quest of food. They flocked to local markets, and then headed toward provincial towns and cities, which they were told had plentiful stores of rice.
In such places, however, the French and Japanese heavily guarded their rice stocks.
The meager assistance available from private charity associations could not solve so grave a crisis. Wandering, begging peasants silently collapsed in the streets or did not wake up after sleeping overnight on the pavements of those cities and towns (Dan Moi, June 6, 1945; TTTB, May 12-June 23, 1945) .
Meanwhile, the Communist-led Viet Minh front skillfully exploited wartime conditions to increase its support. This new mass organization of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) was reportedly created in May 1941 by Nguyen Tat Thanh (the future Ho Chi Minh),7 shortly after the French had arrested two Comintern representatives in Viet-Nam during the French "White Terror" of 1939 Terror" of -1941 . Under the new slogan of "Struggle Against Japanese Fascism and French Imperialism," the Viet Minh front maintained a low profile during the long indirect rule period of the Japanese Occupation (September 1940 . Although the Chinese and American intelligence communities in South China displayed some interest in Thanh and his organization, they only employed Thanh's Viet Minh to collect information on the Japanese via the Chinese warlord Chang Fa-kwei. The attitude of the American field commanders toward Thanh was one of skepticism. In late February 1945-after the Viet Minh had rescued an American pilot-his direct superior, General Claire L.
Chennault, refused to grant Thanh an interview. The Japanese Meigo, however, brought about a sudden change in the American attitude toward the Viet Minh. This change resulted from the urgent need for intelligence on the Japanese military situation in Indochina. The Japanese strike of March 9-10, 1945, had cut off nearly all existing intelligence, previously provided -to the Chinese and Americans by the local French, from Indochina. OSS agents attached to General Gabriel Sabattier's headquarters were 6 According to a Vietnamese press account (Tan Dan, October 31, 1946) , the quantities of southern rice shipped to Tonkin may be summed up as follows: 25,884 metric tons in 1940; 118,752 tons in 1941; 110,000 tons in 1942; 99,099 tons in 1943; 68,841 tons in 1944, 15,222 tons betweenJanuary and and 7,586 tons from April to 7 Although Ho Chi Minh is the subject of several hagiographies, his life is wrapped in a thick veil created by both his friends and foes. For the most recent accounts of his life, see Vu 1984:chaps. 4, 6, 9, 12, and 13. obliged to leave Indochina along with General Sabattier and his su 1980:75-80; Spector 1983:39-40; SHAT [Vincennes] : iGH 8
On March 17, Charles Fenn, an OSS officer attached to the Am Aid Section (AGAS) in China, was authorized to contact Thanh, who was then given the code name "Lucius" and sent back into Indochina with two American agents (Fenn 1973:76-80) . Later, Thanh was also approached by Captain Archimedes L. Patti, who, reportedly was impressed by Thanh's sincerity and indifference to the abundant OSS operational fund; Patti ignored Thanh's Communist background and continued to employ him along with the French agents (Patti 1980:83-87, 104-5 ). Patti's decision, it should be noted, was an important one. Thereafter, thanks to the American weapons, medicine, equipment, and, particularly, the pretense of the American government's recognition and support, the ICP-under the banner of the Viet Minh quickly recovered from its dismemberment at the hands of the French during the period between 1939 and 1944 (Lieu et al. 1960; DOM [Aix] , C.P., cartons 161 and 192) . The Viet Minh's propaganda organs successfully portrayed it as the sole legitimate "associate" of the winning Allies in Viet-Nam and vehemently denounced Bao Dai's proclamation of independence as doc lap banh ve (token independence) (see, for instance, Lieu 1945) . Viet Minh cadres also actively exploited the famine to mobilize the masses and to create an atmosphere favorable to their upcoming insurrection, which was anticipated by the time of the Allied landings in China and Indochina in the fall of 1945 and the spring of 1946 (Woodside 1976:228, 232-33 ; Republique Democratique du Viet-Nam 1959:28-48 (Shiraishi 1982: 226-27) . General Tsuchihashi, however, did not want to place Cuong De on the throne, probably hoping to exploit the existing French-created administrative structure (Murakami 1981:511 Kim of a dictionary in progress. According to Kim, Trac convinced him to cosign a letter requesting their evacuation from Viet-Nam to Singapore. In early November, the Japanese brought them to Saigon. After a short period of residence in the Kempeitai office, they became the guests of Dai Nan Koosi, a Japanese commercial firm owned by Matsushita Mitsuhiro, well-known for its intelligence operations, which were thinly disguised.
On January 1, 1944, Kim and Trac embarked for Singapore on a Japanese ship. After spending slightly over a year in this port city, and after Trac's death of lung cancer in December 1944, Kim was transferred to Bangkok. Three months later, on March 30, 1945, he was suddenly recalled to Saigon to be consulted on "history" by the Japanese. As it turned out, he was introduced to General Kawamura (Saburo?), Chief of Staff of the Japanese Garrison Army (38th Army), and Lieutenant-Colonel Hayashi Hidezumi, his chief of political affairs. Kawamura informed Kim that he was among the notables invited by Bao Dai to consult in Hue on the formation of a new independent government. According to his own account, Kim accepted the invitation because Hoang Xuan Han, a young friend and another of his co-editors, was also on
Kim left Saigon on April 2, 1945, and he arrived in Hue three days later. On April 7, Bao Dai granted him a personal meeting and, to his astonishment, the king "looked respectful and spoke right things" (Kim 1969:49 Paris, winter, 1982 Paris, winter, -1983 . 1 am indebted to Mr. Han for granting these in-depth interviews as well as for access to several rare books on Viet-Nam.
Vu
NGU CHIEU One of their first decisions was to change the national name to Viet-Nam. At that time this was a significant, and, in a sense, an urgent task. It implied territorial unification; "Viet-Nam" had been Emperor Gia Long's choice for the national name after his unification of the three regions of the country in 1801. Moreover, this was the first time that Viet nationalists in the three regions officially recognized this national name. In March, for instance, the activists in the North always mentioned "Dai Viet," while those in the South used "Viet-Nam," and the Central leaders used "An-nam" or "Dai Nam." Kim also renamed the three regions of the country-the North (former Tonkin or Bac Ky) became Bac Bo, the Central region (former Annam 12 These dates are given by Khanh himself; interestingly, they are identical to those in Lacouture (1967:14) . Official Vietnamese historians now date Ho's departure from Saigon in May 1911 (Vu and Nguyen 1983:32nl9 1945) . His decision ended a three-month-long speculation concerning a new national flag.
Doan Ket (National Unity). Although national unity is an exceptional phenomenon rather than the normal condition of society, Vietnamese nationalists often accused the French of intentionally dividing the country and its people to facilitate French domination-a valid charge. Newly independent Viet-Nam, thus, would need the cement of "national unity" both "spiritually and politically" (L'Action, July 21, 1945) to bind its factions and social strata together. Ironically, however, the appeal for national unity worked more against than for the success of Kim's government.
At that time, Vietnamese society was on the verge of revolution. 1945) . Unfortunately, such a cultural synthesis was wishful thinking, too vague for any purpose at the time. Meanwhile, and above all, the Japanese had determined what sort of political theory the "new"
Empire of Viet-Nam should follow-that was later refined as "interdependence" or "satellite" independence.
Neither the Japanese nor Kim wanted to see rapid change in administrative structure, and therefore the French-created bureaucracy that was in place remained nearly intact. However, during the first days after Japan's purge, a state of confusion persisted. Some administrators and functionaries left their posts to take refuge in bigger cities and towns (L'Action, June 27, 1945) . Under prevailing conditions, it would take months to bring the system back to normal. Time, however, was not on Kim's side.
Less than four months after he came to power, Japan collapsed, and with it his government.
In the areas where Kim's government was able to assert control-the cities and Military strength-a factor that might have helped Kim's government to deflect challenges from competing groups-was absolutely beyond Kim's control. His government did not have even a nominal defense minister. Some former tirailleurs (Vie soldiers under French rule) were assembled into a new organization, the Viet Nam Nghia Dung Quan (Viet-Nam Righteous Warriors), but they were kept safely under direct Japanese control. The police were also reorganized and controlled by the Japanese. Congress, Hearings [May 19721:243-80; Patti 1980:129) . The OSS and, in particular, its information on the geopolitical situation not only strengthened the position and popularity of the Viet Minh but also helped Ho to exploit Japan's sudden surrender (Vu 1984: chap. 9 Against the Famine. Although their latitude for action was limited, Kim's government devoted its most concentrated efforts to fighting the famine. On the one hand, Kim asked for and obtained Japan's approval to abandon the forced sale of rice in Trung Bo and an exemption for those who owned rice fields of less than three mou (mau) in Bac Bo (L'Action, May 19, 1945; Hai Phong, July 16, 1945) . His minister of supplies, Nguyen Huu Thi, was sent to Saigon to arrange the transport of rice from the South to Trung Bo and Bac Bo. In order to avoid American air raids, ports outside of Saigon were used as departure points for convoys of wooden vessels. Private rice shippers were granted freedom of transport, purchase, and sale. To prevent dishonest practices, however, strict control over rice price and stockage was decreed. Offenders could be given the death sentence and have their property and assets confiscated (Tin Moi, July 17, 1945) . In Bac Bo, Kim created the Ty Liem Phong Kinh Te (Economic Police Office) to fight the malpractices of blackmarketeering under Nguyen Duy Que (Tin Moi, July 10 and 11, and August 3, 1945) . A number of owners of rice depots were arrested and fined for their violations. On the other hand, Kim ordered the concentration of famine survivors and homeless wanderers into special camps. A press campaign stimulated the mushrooming development of famine relief associations 1945) . In several provinces, the problem swiftly changed from a shortage of rice to a lack of harvest workers (Dan Moi, June 6, 1945) . With the arrival of rice cargo ships from the South in July 1945, the famine finally ended.
Tax Reforms. Like its Communist arch rival, Kim's government wanted to tackle the issue of taxes, particularly the unpopular thue than (capitation tax). Under French rule, this tax was divided into thirteen categories, from 750 piasters (the first tax bracket) to 3.50 piasters (the thirteenth tax bracket). In addition, each individual had to pay an amount equal to 60 percent of his principal tax for the regional budget and from 45 to 60 percent for the provincial budget, which meant that those of the thirteenth tax bracket, about 2,300,000 households, each had to pay a total of 7.70 piasters per year as their capitation tax. Kim successfully persuaded the Japanese to grant households in the thirteenth category a significant tax reduction. This group was then divided into two categories, the thirteenth and the fourteenth. About 1,800,000 taxpayers assigned to the redefined thirteenth tax bracket now had to pay a total amount of 3 piasters per year, and another 500,000 in the fourteenth bracket were to pay only 1 piaster. All additional regional and provincial taxes were suppressed. This tax reform was actually only adopted in Bac Bo. But on his own authority, Kim granted to the propertyless people and low-income employees of Trung Bo an exemption from the capitation tax. In Nam Bo, the Japanese continued to apply the Frenchimposed tax brackets of 1944 (Nuoc Nam, March 3, 1945; L'Action, May 19 and 30, 1945 Moi, June 13, 14, 23, 25, and July 18, 1945) . Hoang Xuan Han, the minister of education, also worked hard to Vietnamize public secondary education.
Such projects required a longer period than four months to achieve their full results, but they prepared the ground for the Viet Minh to launch its compulsory mass education in the near future. In July, when the Japanese decided to grant Viet-Nam full independence and territorial unification, Kim's government was preparing to carry out much more profound educational reform, starting with the formation of a national committee responsible for the creation of a national system of education.
Judicial Reforms. In his role as minister of justice, Trinh Dinh Thao launched an attempt to reform the existing judicial systems. In Kim's most impressive project was the organization of youth. Phan Anh, the minister of youth, attempted to centralize and strictly control all the youth organizations, which had proliferated immediately after March 9, 1945. On May 25, an imperial order laid down an inclusive, hierarchical structure for youth organizations. At the top was the National Youth Council, a consultative organ, to advise the minister of youth. Similar councils were to be organized down to the district level (L'Action, June 16, 1945) . Meanwhile, youngsters were asked to join the local squads or groups, from provincial to communal levels. They were given physical training and were responsible for the maintenance of security in their communes. Each provincial town Cambodia, and Laos, effective July 1 (L'Action, July 12, 1945). This move was followed by Bao Dai's issuance of four imperial orders: establishing the National Consultative Committee (Hoi dong Tu van Quoc Gia); a fifteen-member committee for the elaboration of a constitution; a fifteen-member committee for the reform of administration, legislation, and finance; and a committee for the reform of national education-the last included two women among its eighteen members (L'Action, July 13 and 17, 1945; Tinh Tien, July 3, 1945) . For the first time, leaders from Nam Bo (for example, Tran Van An and Ho Van Nga) were invited to join these committees.
Meanwhile, other developments in Nam Bo in early July may be seen as preparatory steps by the Japanese toward granting territorial unification to Viet-Nam. In early July, when Nam Bo was alive with the spirit of independence and mass participation because of the creation of the Vanguard Youth organizations in Saigon and other provincial towns, Governor Minoda announced the organization of the Hoi nghi Nam
Bo (Council of Nam Bo) to facilitate his governing task. This council was to be responsible for giving advice on the questions submitted to it by the Japanese and for inspecting provincial affairs. Its main task, Minoda underlined, was to make the Vietnamese realize that they had to collaborate closely with the Japanese, because "if (Kim 1969:84, 91 ). Returning to Thuan-hoa, Kim also found rising conflict among his ministers. Tran Van Chuong (who had started negotiations with the Japanese in May) wanted credit for arranging the return of the ceded cities and Nam Bo to Kim's government and, probably, the premiership itself (Kim 1969:88-89) . The government meetings of August 5 and 6 were marked by personal quarrels and the resignation of the ministers of interior, economy, and supplies.
Ho Ta Khanh, the economy minister, even demanded the resignation of the entire government. In his view, the Viet Minh should be given a chance to govern because of its strength (Kim 1969:89; Brocheux 1982:166 On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. The next day, the second atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki, and Japan could no longer continue the -war. Surrender negotiations ensued, and Japan decided to give Kim and Vietnamese patriots what they had expected for years-national independence and territorial unification. Kim was repeatedly urged to come to Saigon to receive the official control of Nam Bo (Kim 1969:90) . However, numerous factors prevented him from leaving the capital. From August 8 onward, Pham Khac Hoe Bao Dai's office director-was instructed by Ton Quang Phiet (the future chairman of the Revolutionary Committee in Hue) to persuade the king to abdicate voluntarily.
In order to carry out his mission, Hoe constantly undermined Kim, particularly by citing Kim's failure to invite the most influential figures to Thuan-hoa to form a new government (Hoe 1982:62-63) . Meanwhile, Interior Minister Nam, citing the uprisings in Thanh-hoa and Quang-ngai in Trung Bo as the main reasons, discouraged
Kim from going to Saigon (Hoe 1982:62-63; Kim 1969:89) . The task of receiving sovereignty over Nam Bo was thus temporarily entrusted to the Council of Nam Bo. The Frustrating End. In August, Viet-Nam went through one of its most eventful phases, played out against the background of global politics. On the one hand, the Allies began to put into effect their postwar plans for Viet-Nam, ranging from the disarmament of Japanese troops to the division of spheres of influence; on the other hand, the Japanese on the scene were paralyzed both by the unconditional surrender of their home government and the prospect of Allied retribution. Concerning the Vietnamese, the Japanese were divided psychologically and ideologically. Some Japanese leaned toward the Viet Minh, releasing Communist prisoners, providing weapons to the Viet Minh front, and even offering their services to the local Viet Minh forces (Lieu et al. 1960: vol. 1:43-44) . Others, including the military commanders, wanted to use their forces to support Kim's government and to crush the Etsumei (Viet Minh) (Kim 1969:93; Dan Chu, September 12, 1945) . Confusion reigned over the country, and it stimulated a race to power by diverse Vietnamese political groups.
On the eve of Japan's surrender, Kim and his men attempted to take control of the situation. On August 12, Kim's outgoing government was retained as "Provisional Government" to conduct daily affairs. Kim asked Bao Dai to issue an imperial order on August 14 abrogating the Franco-Viet treaties of June 6, 1862, and March 13, 1874, thus casting off the last French claims to sovereign rights over Viet-Nam (Bao Dai 1980:114-15 Phu-tho and Binh-xuyen (Cuu Quoc, September 5, and November 5, 1945) . As for Ho's principal armed force, it should be noted that it was called the Quan Giai Phong (Liberation Army) in the fall of 1945, and was later renamed Ve Quoc Doan (National Protection Brigade). Federation and the French Union-which was much less than an autonomous state and, more importantly, was simply a passing promise on the French part in order to peacefully enter northern Viet-Nam (Vu 1984:chaps. 12, 13, and 14) . Finally, after the outbreak of a full-scale war between the French and the Viet Minh, Kim's free mass political participation was firmly channeled into ICP-controlled political participation. I am enclined to believe that this sort of monopoly of patriotism endorsed by Ho Chi Minh and his ICP was one of the major factors leading to the end of the revolutionary fervor of 1945 and, thus, to the Thirty Years' War Although Viet-Nam was given only conditional independence under Japanese military authority, and although the country was only reunified near the end of the war, Kim's process of Vietnamization was significant. He cast off French influence-from the adoption of Vietnamese romanized script as the official language to the change of street, city, and regional names; from the free formation of political parties to the replacement of French officials by Vietnamese cong chuc (civil servants). In the local press words such as "Annam," "Tonkin," "Cochinchine," and "Annamite" were gradually replaced by new terms with more positive connotations. The popular acceptance of Kim's terms is evident in their subsequent adoption by Ho's DRVN. Given the extent to which the French had patronized the Viets-both culturally and personally such a change was significant.
In examining Ho's projects after September 2, 1945, one discovers that-save for Ho's Communist revolutionary regime and his monopoly of nationalism-most of the major points advanced by the DRVN in late 1945 and early 1946 were nearly identical to those of its predecessor: romanized Vietnamese was exclusively used in classrooms and offices; cities and streets were renamed; and the forced sale of rice and the capitation tax were abolished. On the very afternoon of September 2, 1945, Ho disguised his intention to seek a self-governing state within the French-controlled Indochinese Fed-20 This shift of policy at first seemed to be intertwined with a plan for personnel change. In May and June 1945, rumors of Cuong De's homecoming began to spread through the country. The prince's message to his citizens, dated January 11, 1944, was published in a weekly magazine in Hanoi (Nuoc Nam, April 28-May 12, 1945) . Vietnamese representatives reportedly attended the Greater East Asia Conference held in May in Kudan (Japan), under the auspices of General Matsui Iwane's Asian Development General Headquarters of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. On May 27, one of Cuong De's followers arrived in Saigon from Tokyo and declared that there would be an important change in Vietnamese politics in the very near future (Hai Phong, June 7, 1945) . In the following days, he worked hard to promote the prince's return. Meanwhile, on May 28, Tran Van Anknown as one of the two leaders of the Phuc Quoc in Nam Bo-was brought back to Saigon after nearly two years in exile in Singapore. A few days later, the Hanoi weekly Thong Tin published a photograph of five patriots belonging to the Uy Ban Kien Quoc (Committee for National Reconstruction), including Vu Van An, Vu Dinh Dy, Ngo Dinh Diem, Nguyen Xuan Chu, and Le Toan all of whom had been rumored to be members of Cuong De's exile government prior to March 9, 1945 (Thong Tin, June 10, 1945 . According to Shiraishi (1982:239-40) , in a meeting with Bao Dai on June 11, Governor-General Tsuchihashi brought up the issue of Cuong De and obtained Bao Dai's approval for his return to Viet-Nam as president of the Privy Council. Not much more than this, however, is known about the Tsuchihashi-Bao Dai meeting. What we can be certain of is that there was a tentative plan to bring Cuong De back to Viet-Nam. On July 20, 1945, General Matsui declared in Japan that the prince was to return to Viet-Nam to assist his nephew, Bao Dai, in state affairs. Five days later, Cuong De also issued a statement stressing his gratitude to Japan and pledging his sincere collaboration with Japan after his return home (Nippon Times, July 30, 1945) .
Cuong De, however, did not return to Viet-Nam. The sudden end of the war might be a plausible explanation (Shiraishi 1982:240 were to reconquer Viet-Nam (Giap 1974:32; Cuu Quoc, September 5, 1945) .
To be sure, this similarity was more in pathos than in ethos. The difference, if not the contradiction, between Ho and Kim was rooted in their personal and ideological backgrounds. Kim was a successful scholar and a moderate urban nationalist. Ho was unlucky in his educational path, he failed to gain entry to the Ecole Coloniale that Kim did attend; he spent his youth in foreign ports as an assistant cook or janitor;
and he later discovered the revolutionary path thanks to Lenin's writings and Soviet support (Vu and Nguyen 1983 worldview; he espoused the popular concept of social participation-that is, engage in or withdraw from the task of governing at the right time and, in so doing, offer your best. In contrast, Ho-about ten years younger than Kim-was a professional
Communist revolutionary who was street smart. He fought his way to power with dogged determination. Ideologically, Kim believed in evolutionary change in society.
Change, thus, would be gradual and under the guidance of the elite to prevent a sudden breakdown of social and moral order. In contrast, rejected by established society, Ho advocated a complete destruction of the "remnants" or "symbols" of monarchism and colonialism in order to build up a new socialist society and state. In addition to charisma, a deep belief in Marxism-Leninism, a well-organized and disciplined party, and his armed forces, Ho's personal background and his connections with the two superpowers at the end of World War II gave him great effectiveness in the struggle for power in . However, in 1945 and 1946 Kim's historical role was more significant than has been generally appreciated. It may be true, as Vo Nguyen Giap wrote, that in August 1945 the Viet Minh "pulled down the tarnished yellow flags-a product of the brief Japanese occupation-as though plucking away wormy leaves." Nevertheless, Kim's achievements will not "sink into oblivion, without leaving a trace" (Giap 1974:22) . In the final analysis, Ho was the principal beneficiary of, among the other things, Kim's achievements. 
